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The aim of the present study is to shed light on the diplomatic achievements of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by exploring the way in which 
it has dealt with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by China. ASEAN 
is little more than an association of minor powers with insignificant military and 
economic capabilities. However, in its dealings with the BRI, it has proactively 
advanced its own interests by skillfully conducting equidistant diplomacy with China 
and the US, without becoming too remote from or too close to either one of them, 
thereby reaping benefits from its favorable relations with each of them. 
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Introduction
Within the large geographical area covered by China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), Southeast Asia occupies an important strategic location. This region has 
several maritime chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the 
Lombok Strait, all of which are positioned on important international shipping 
routes connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The BRI comprises 
the “economic belt” stretching from the western part of China to Central Asia 
and Europe, and the “maritime road” extending from the coastal area of China to 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe. Due to the 
geographical proximity of the Southeast Asian nations to China, the former are 
effectively linking the latter with more than fifty states located along this “road.” 
Few leaders have recognized the strategic importance of Southeast Asia 
more clearly than the Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is why he announced 
the Chinese twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road initiative at the Indonesian 
Parliament in October 2013, bearing in mind the major role Jakarta commonly 
plays in Southeast Asian affairs. This initiative eventually developed into the BRI, 
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together with the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative announced in Kazakhstan 
one month earlier. It is also worth mentioning that, when President Xi visited 
Indonesia in October 2013, he officially unveiled a plan to establish the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a regional development bank meant to 
serve as the financial basis of the BRI.  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the central player 
in this strategically important region. This association was established in 1967, 
against the background of the East-West confrontation at the global level and 
the Vietnam War at the regional level, by five Southeast Asian nations, namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Today it has 
developed into an association of ten nations, including Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia. Remarkably, it has become an important player in 
Southeast Asia and beyond, hosting mega-regional forums such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), the ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Nevertheless, after all, it is 
little more than an association of minor powers with insignificant military and 
economic capabilities. In the competitive world of international relations, minor 
powers are usually at the mercy of major powers and unable to advance their 
own interests by their own means. The reality of international relations is that, in 
the words of Thucydides who studied the history of the Peloponnesian War, the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (Strassler 1996, 352). 
However, a careful assessment of ASEAN’s dealings with the BRI reveals that this 
kind of common understanding is not always accurate. 
The aim of the present study is to shed light on ASEAN’s diplomatic 
achievements by exploring three questions concerning the BRI. The first section 
explores what the BRI is, in the context of global geopolitics. It argues that the BRI 
is something which constitutes a core element of the geopolitical rivalry between 
China and the United States today. The second section examines what the BRI is 
for ASEAN. It maintains that the BRI is something which prompts the Southeast 
Asian association to tackle a major task of conducting equidistant diplomacy with 
Beijing and Washington. The third section explores the way in which ASEAN has 
dealt with the BRI. It holds that this association has basically committed itself to 
the BRI; yet, at the same time, it has been careful not to overcommit itself. Thus, 
while keeping a certain distance from China, it has cleverly strengthened its 
economic and security relations with the United States. The concluding section 
sums up the argument by stating that, in its dealings with the BRI, an association 
of minor powers in Southeast Asia has proactively advanced its own interests by 
skillfully conducting equidistant diplomacy with China and the United States.  
Before proceeding any further, a practical issue should be mentioned: 
at the risk of oversimplification, the present study addresses the policies and 
interests of ASEAN as a single entity. This kind of approach can only be justified 
when the focus of analysis is on ASEAN’s external relations. The members of 
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this association disagree on many issues within Southeast Asia, but often share 
common interests when they deal with external powers, and therefore speak 
with one voice and act as a single “diplomatic community,” so as to ensure a more 
significant role than any member could have played alone (Leifer 1989, 86, 152; 
1995, 133). 
BRI in Global Geopolitics 
What is the BRI in the context of global geopolitics? In short, the BRI is something 
which constitutes a core element of the geopolitical rivalry between China and 
the United States today. There is little doubt that the rivalry between these two 
major powers has become intense in recent years. What is especially notable 
about their rivalry is the fact that its geographical scope has expanded, as the 
notion of the “Indo-Pacific” has been added to the lexicon of global geopolitics. 
This kind of development is partly driven by the implementation of the BRI by 
China. 
The nature of the BRI can become a subject of debate. For its advocates, the 
BRI is a promising economic project, aimed at facilitating international economic 
exchanges for the sake of mutual benefits between China and its partners by 
developing infrastructure needed for such exchanges, including railroads, 
highways, ports, and pipelines. Thus, many countries, including those in Europe 
and North America, should actively participate in it and collaborate with Beijing 
to expand its economic scale (see, for example, Wang 2016; Li and Zheng 2019; 
Zhang 2019). In contrast, for its critics, it is an ill-motivated geopolitical project, 
aimed at expanding not only Beijing’s economic roles but also its political and 
security presence in a broad area encompassing Southeast Asia, Central Asia, 
the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe. Hence, the world has every reason to 
worry about it, and the European and North American countries in particular 
should implement various measures to prevent its successful development (see, 
for example, Kliman and Grace 2018; The Economist 2018; Shabir 2018; for mixed 
views, see Tekdal 2018; Gong 2019). 
In any case, it is fair to say that the BRI is indeed an important component 
of China’s global strategy, regardless of whether its nature is benign or malign. 
This country is certainly looking at a broad geographical area, and its focus 
extends as far as East Africa. At the summit meeting of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation in September 2018, President Xi underlined the significance 
of Beijing’s infrastructure projects in Africa in the context of the BRI, and made 
it clear that China will strengthen its commitment to Africa (Xi 2018). Notably, 
in January 2017, in collaboration with its local partners, China constructed a 
railroad in East Africa which connects Ethiopia and Djibouti. Although the 
latter is a small country, it faces the Gulf of Aden and occupies one of the most 
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strategically important places in global geopolitics. It was in such an important 
place that China built its first overseas military base in August 2017. 
Few countries around the world are more concerned about China’s global 
activism than the United States. Many aspects of Beijing’s BRI are incompatible 
with Washington’s global strategy, from the viewpoint of the latter. Unsurprisingly, 
the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States today has become 
bitter. One of the areas in which their rivalry is most serious is the Indo-Pacific, 
which encompasses the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The importance of 
the Indo-Pacific in the BRI cannot be overemphasized because a major section 
of the “maritime road” runs through the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 
In May 2018, Washington renamed its Pacific Command the “U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command,” although its area of responsibility had already included not only 
the Pacific Ocean but also the Indian Ocean. Washington did so, in order to 
manage the two maritime areas in a comprehensive way without allowing China 
to expand its influence there. It can be said that the Indo-Pacific has become the 
frontline of the rivalry between China and the United States today, partly due to 
its relevance to the former’s BRI. 
ASEAN’s Task 
What is the BRI for ASEAN? In short, the BRI is something which prompts this 
association to tackle a major task of conducting equidistant diplomacy with 
China and the United States, with the aim of reaping benefits from its favorable 
relations with each of them. To the extent that the BRI constitutes a core element 
of the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States today, it inevitably 
makes it difficult for ASEAN to manage its relations with both of these two major 
powers. For this association, it is imperative that it skillfully conduct equidistant 
diplomacy with them, without becoming too remote from or too close to either 
one of them.1 
This kind of diplomatic task has always been important in post-Cold War 
Southeast Asia, which is marked by the presence of a number of major players, 
such as China, the United States, Japan, and India. ASEAN’s relations with these 
external powers should largely be equidistant, and its relations with each of them 
should be neither too remote nor too close. For this association, it is simply 
unwise to become too remote from any of them and to lose great opportunities to 
get benefits from favorable relations. Becoming too remote from one is especially 
undesirable if it means becoming too close to another. It is unwise to become 
too close to any of the external powers because doing so would run the risk of 
becoming over-dependent on it. Needless to say, it is also unwise to build close 
relations with one particular external power at the expense of the association’s 
existing relations with another. After all, only by conducting equidistant diplomacy 
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with various external powers without becoming too remote from or too close 
to any one of them can an association of minor powers in Southeast Asia reap 
benefits from its favorable relations with each of them. 
It is fair to say that equidistant diplomacy encompasses the strategy of 
hedging, which has attracted scholarly attention in the past decade or two 
(examples of early works include Chung 2004; Goh 2005). ASEAN’s equidistant 
diplomacy has two dimensions: one is to maximize the benefits by maintaining 
favorable relations with various external powers and the other is to minimize the 
risk of becoming over-dependent on any of them. The hedging strategy addresses 
the latter dimension, in that it is all about hedging against potential risks (for a 
different conceptualization, see Kuik 2016). 
Given its risk-minimization dimension, it can be said that equidistant 
diplomacy addresses ASEAN’s long-term concern about external interference. 
Since its establishment in 1967, the association has always been concerned about 
the possibility of external powers interfering in Southeast Asian affairs. This is 
hardly surprising, bearing in mind that most of its members had been colonized 
by Western powers for a long time, and gained independence only in the post-
war era. For ASEAN, the minimization of the risk of over-dependency through 
the exercise of equidistant diplomacy must be a prerequisite for preventing 
external interference, in that one of the possible consequences of becoming over-
dependent on an external power must be to allow it to interfere in Southeast 
Asian affairs. 
The rest of this section focuses on ASEAN’s policy over the last few decades 
toward China and the United States in turn, for a better understanding of its 
equidistant diplomacy with Beijing and Washington. 
ASEAN’s Policy toward China 
From the viewpoint of ASEAN, China is a country which can easily pose a threat 
to regional security in Southeast Asia. It is geographically proximate to this region, 
and far greater than any of the nations there in terms of military power, economic 
potential, and the population size. Historically speaking, it has frequently worried 
many of the ASEAN members. To begin with, during the Cold War era, it often 
supported the anti-government communist factions within these members. This 
was a source of serious security concern for them, since they were having a hard 
time governing their post-independent multiethnic societies. In addition, in 1992, 
Beijing effectively declared ownership of many of the islands in the South China 
Sea by instituting its own maritime law. This inevitably exacerbated the territorial 
disputes between Beijing and the Southeast Asian claimants to these islands, 
namely, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam. Since then, Beijing has 
in principle maintained a rigid attitude toward ASEAN in addressing the South 
China Sea disputes. To be sure, in 2002, it modified its uncompromising stance, 
and the two parties issued a joint declaration on appropriate conduct in the South 
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China Sea in 2002 (ASEAN and China 2002a). Yet this was not a legally binding 
agreement, but a political declaration. To this day, the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea have remained a bone of contention between the two parties. 
However, over the last few decades, ASEAN has steadily strengthened its 
relations with China, with the aim of building win-win relations. Although 
Beijing can easily pose a threat to regional security in Southeast Asia, it can also 
bring a lot of benefits to this region. Hence, especially in the post-Cold War era, 
the ASEAN members have been proactive toward China. In 1990, Indonesia 
reestablished diplomatic relations with China, which had been severed for more 
than two decades since 1967. Singapore followed suit, and established official 
relations with Beijing in the same year. Owning to these positive developments, 
ASEAN invited China to attend the first meeting of the ARF in 1994, the PMC in 
1996, and also the de facto first summit meeting of the APT in 1997, in the wake 
of the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. Rather than excluding Beijing from 
these forums, the Southeast Asian association chose to engage and collaborate 
with it to achieve mutual benefits within these forums. 
In the twenty-first century, ASEAN has further deepened and broadened 
its cooperative relations with China. It has concluded a series of economic 
agreements with Beijing, thereby promoting free trade in goods and services 
and also multiplying investment opportunities (ASEAN and China 2002b, 2007, 
2009). With regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it has been 
exploring a few different ways to issue a legally binding code of conduct. Perhaps 
more importantly, in October 2018, the ASEAN members conducted for the 
first time a joint maritime exercise with Beijing. To be sure, this was not a naval 
exercise to constrain a particular enemy country, but an exercise in search and 
rescue operations and medical evacuation. Still, in terms of maritime security 
cooperation between ASEAN and China, it was undoubtedly a significant event. 
ASEAN’s Policy toward the United States 
The United States is a “benign power” in the eyes of ASEAN (Haacke 2002, 139-
40). It has for decades maintained favorable relations with this association. To 
begin with, during the establishment process of ASEAN in the second half of the 
1960s, the United States refrained from throwing its weight around in the capitals 
of the original members of this association. One of the regional security strategies 
Washington was considering at the time was to develop a new Southeast regional 
association into an anti-communist military organization, capable of contributing 
to its grand Cold War strategy in one way or another. It did not implement this 
strategy partly because it was aware of the tendency of the Southeast Asian 
nations to dislike external interference (Jo 2009, 208-14). Moreover, since the 
establishment of the association in 1967, the United States has contributed to the 
maintenance of regional security in Southeast Asia, mainly on a bilateral basis. 
Most notably, in the South China Sea, which is one of the busiest sea lines of 
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communication in the world, it has safeguarded the freedom of navigation (FON) 
by using its enormous naval power. Since 2015, it has been carrying out a series 
of FON operations, partly intended to constrain Chinese activities there.  
For a long time, the ASEAN members have heavily relied on this benign 
power for their national security. Thailand and the Philippines have maintained 
their military alliances with Washington for decades. Malaysia and Singapore 
have received substantial assistance from the United States since the Cold War 
era, despite their officially declared policy of non-alignment. Singapore in the 
post-Cold War era has been remarkably eager to cement its security relations 
with Washington. It has concluded a series of agreements with this global power 
to provide logistic support to US naval ships, make its military facilities available 
for the rotational deployment of U.S. naval ships, and host an area command of 
the U.S. navy, MSCFE (Military Sealift Command Far East).2 
Unsurprisingly, ASEAN has always identified the maintenance of U.S. 
engagement in Southeast Asian security as one of its policy priorities, given 
its members’ heavy reliance on Washington for their national security. This 
association has always been aware that a “benign power” can easily become 
capricious and concentrate on other regions because Southeast Asia is by no 
means high on the list of its strategic priorities. This is why ASEAN began holding 
regular meetings with the United States as early as 1977, invited Washington to 
the very first meeting of the PMC in 1979, and has made continuous efforts to 
strengthen its diplomatic ties with this global player to this day. 
However, at the same time, ASEAN has cautiously avoided becoming over-
dependent on the United States. Without relying exclusively on one particular 
external power, it has sought to diversify its diplomatic partners, by building 
cooperative relations with various major players in the Asia-Pacific region 
and beyond. Especially since the 1990s, while not downplaying the value of its 
bilateral relations with Washington, it has placed importance on Asia-Pacific 
multilateralism. In 1993/94, it established its own Asia-Pacific region-wide 
framework, the ARF, and initiated in 2005 another region-wide framework at the 
summit level, the EAS. It has invited not only the United States but also various 
other major players—including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, and Russia—to take part in these multilateral forums. 
On the basis of these forums, ASEAN has not only been contributing 
to the construction of regional order in the Asia-Pacific region but also been 
increasing its own presence in this region. Since the 2000s, its presence has been 
conceptualized as “ASEAN’s centrality” in Asia-Pacific multilateralism. This can 
be regarded as a remarkable achievement for an association of minor powers. 
Only by avoiding exclusive reliance on one particular external power, inviting 
various major players to take part in its own multilateral forums, and building 
cooperative relations with all of them, has such an association been able to claim 
itself as the center of Asia-Pacific multilateralism (Katsumata 2014). 
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ASEAN’s Dealings with the BRI 
In what way has ASEAN dealt with the BRI? In other words, in what way has the 
Southeast Asian association taken up the major task of conducting equidistant 
diplomacy with China and the United States? In short, it has basically committed 
itself to the BRI; yet, at the same time, it has been careful not to overcommit itself. 
Thus, while keeping a certain distance from China, it has cleverly strengthened 
its economic and security relations with the United States. The present section 
discusses ASEAN’s dealings with the BRI in detail. 
Committing to the BRI 
ASEAN has basically committed itself to the BRI, repeatedly expressing its 
support for Beijing’s mega development initiative, partly for the sake of the 
implementation of its own regional development plan, entitled the Master Plan 
on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (see ASEAN 2017; ASEAN and China 2019). 
Although China is a country which can easily pose a threat to regional security 
in Southeast Asia, the association of the nations there has responded positively to 
the Chinese initiative, and these nations collaborated with Beijing on a number 
of infrastructure development projects, with the aim of reaping as much benefit 
as possible from these projects. The BRI does offer the ASEAN members great 
opportunities to reap substantial benefits. Southeast Asia occupies an important 
strategic place within the BRI, and the nations there are effectively linking Beijing 
with more than fifty states located along the “maritime road,” as noted earlier. 
While Southeast Asia is strategically important to China, the BRI is economically 
promising to the nations in this region.    
For a fuller understanding of ASEAN’s commitment to the BRI, it is worth 
focusing on the case of Singapore. This Southeast Asian city-state may seem 
less likely than most of the other ASEAN members to commit itself to China’s 
initiative because, while enjoying strong security ties with Washington, it has less 
close relations with Beijing than most of the other members have (see Shambaugh 
2018, 100-03). It is worth restating, in this respect, that the BRI constitutes a core 
element of the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States today. 
Nonetheless, Singapore has been an unabashed supporter of the BRI. Although it 
is sometimes manipulated by China’s great diplomatic skills, it has never failed to 
make best efforts to maintain collaborative relations with Beijing. 
To illustrate, China exercised skillful diplomacy vis-à-vis Singapore when 
it held the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in its capital 
city in May 2017. While inviting presidents and prime ministers from a number 
of countries to this forum, it did not send an invitation to the Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, but to the Singaporean Development Minister 
Lawrence Wong. By so doing, it quietly expressed its dissatisfaction with 
Singaporean foreign policy. The city-state had been arbitrarily prioritizing its 
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common interests with Washington at the expense of its relations with Beijing, 
from the viewpoint of the latter (see Tan 2017; Singapore Herald 2017). 
Singapore responded to Chinese diplomacy promptly, and rushed to 
improve its relations with Beijing. In particular, in April 2018, it swiftly signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Beijing to facilitate collaboration between 
Singaporean and Chinese companies in third-party markets along the belt and 
road (Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore 2018a). On the basis of this 
memorandum, the Singaporean ministry of trade co-organized with its Chinese 
counterpart a BRI investment forum, involving about 300 business leaders from a 
wide range of sectors (Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore 2018b). It can 
be said that, given its position as the hub of a mega-regional trade network across 
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, non-involvement in the BRI has never 
been an option for the Southeast Asian city-state. 
Avoiding Over-Commitment 
Although ASEAN has basically committed itself to the BRI, it has been careful 
not to overcommit itself, and therefore kept a certain distance from China. 
This kind of cautious attitude is comprehensible, in that over-commitment can 
easily result in overdependence, which inevitably gives Beijing opportunities 
to throw its weight around in Southeast Asia. One of the major concerns of 
the ASEAN members is to lose control over their own domestic infrastructure. 
When a country overcommits itself to an infrastructure development project 
of the BRI and falls behind in the payment of its debt, it may lose its rights to 
the infrastructure itself. The case of Sri Lanka is notable in this respect. This 
country was unable to pay off its debt, and ended up handing over the rights to 
its Hambantota Port to a Chinese governmental enterprise for a period of 99 
years in December 2017. Sri Lanka may not be the only one, and some Southeast 
Asian nations may encounter similar problems because of their financial 
difficulties. In particular, Laos and Cambodia seem financially strapped.3 For any 
ASEAN member, a loss of control over its own domestic infrastructure is simply 
unacceptable, given its particular concern about external interference. 
To be sure, ASEAN itself has never declared any intention of limiting the 
level of its commitment to the BRI, but the overall tendency of its members has 
clearly been to avoid over-commitment. This can be highlighted by focusing 
on Myanmar and Malaysia, both of which have already begun to limit their 
commitment to infrastructure development projects of the BRI, so as to 
mitigate the risk of debt distress. First, because of its very close ties with China, 
Myanmar may seem less likely than most of the other members to limit the level 
of its commitment. Nevertheless, in July 2018, it decided to scale down a port 
development project in its Kyaukpyu special economic zone, which is situated 
along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. This decision was a major blow to Beijing, 
given the economic potential of the Sino-Myanmar oil and natural gas pipelines 
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running from Kyaukpyu to Kunming in the Yunnan province of China. Yet 
the decision was necessary for the Myanmar government, given the country’s 
potential vulnerability to debt distress.  
Second, Malaysia, whose position in the spectrum of the ASEAN members’ 
closeness to China is roughly in the middle (see Shambaugh 2018, 100-03), 
cancelled in August 2018 a few large infrastructure development projects, 
including those for natural gas pipelines and a railroad connecting its capital 
city with its east coast cities. These projects had been major components of the 
BRI, and actively promoted by the former Prime Minister Najib Razak. When 
Mahathir Mohamad came back to power as a result of a general election in May 
2018, fifteen years after stepping down as a prime minister, he decisively cancelled 
these projects, in order to minimize his country’s financial risk. To be sure, in 
April 2019, he decided to restart the railroad project, but only after successfully 
negotiating with China to reduce its cost by more than 30 percent. 
Strengthening Relations with the United States 
While keeping a certain distance from China, ASEAN has cleverly strengthened 
its economic and security relations with the United States. This association has 
been particularly active on the economic front, so as to reap benefits from its 
relations with the United States while avoiding over-dependence on China. Thus, 
the recent development of its economic cooperation with Washington has been 
remarkable. In Manila in November 2017, ASEAN and the United States held 
a special meeting at the summit level to commemorate the fortieth anniversary 
of their institutionalized dialogue relations. The leaders at this meeting made 
sure that they would “support stronger economic engagement” between the two 
parties (ASEAN and the United States 2017). 
Yet it should be mentioned that the development of economic cooperation 
between ASEAN and the United States is by no means a new phenomenon. 
Various achievements of their long-term economic cooperation were highlighted 
during the special meeting in Manila; for example, the ASEAN members 
together rank as the fourth largest export destination for U.S. companies and the 
fourth largest supplier of imports to the United States, with total two-way trade 
amounting to US$ 211.8 billion in 2016 (ibid.). It is worth adding that, thus far, 
ASEAN has received around US$ 274 billion in cumulative investment from 
the United States—an amount more than what the United States has directed to 
China, India, Japan, and South Korea combined (U.S.-ASEAN Business Council 
2017).  
Still, the recent development of economic cooperation between the two 
parties is indeed remarkable. For the further development of the ASEAN 
Economic Community, the Southeast Asian association has received various 
forms of assistance from Washington in recent years under the framework of the 
so-called “U.S.-ASEAN Connect,” established by the U.S. government in 2016. 
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Here critics may point out, by simply looking at the absolute amounts of money 
proposed at the official level, that the benefits ASEAN can expect to gain from 
Beijing’s BRI are far greater than those from Washington’s economic projects, 
including the U.S.-ASEAN Connect. However, it should be noted that, through 
its cooperative relations with Washington, ASEAN can expect to receive not only 
various forms of assistance from the U.S. government, but also large amounts of 
foreign direct investment from U.S. companies (Pitakdumrongkit 2018). 
ASEAN has also been active on the security front. In order not to allow 
China to throw its geopolitical weight around in Southeast Asia and beyond via 
the “maritime road,” this association has constantly put a premium on its long-
term security cooperation with the United States. Notably, at its ministerial 
meeting with Washington in August 2018, it successfully elicited from this global 
player what can be regarded as a word of reassurance about its commitment to 
Southeast Asian regional security. At this meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo stated that his country is a “Pacific nation” which would “remain 
committed to ASEAN centrality under [its] Indo-Pacific strategy” (Pompeo 2018; 
also see Pence 2018). To be sure, this was not the first time and, even during the 
Cold War era, ASEAN often elicited words of reassurance from the United States. 
One of the essential purposes of ASEAN’s PMC in the 1980s was to make sure, 
through the process of coordinating its policy toward the conflict in Cambodia 
with Washington’s, that the United States would remain committed to Southeast 
Asian regional security. Nonetheless, what ASEAN elicited from the United 
States at the 2018 ministerial meeting was crucial, in that it was an reassurance 
from this global player in the context of its strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which 
has become the frontline of its rivalry with China today. Thereafter, premised on 
the U.S. commitment, defense cooperation between the two parties developed 
further, resulting in the first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise in September 2019. 
Last but not least, ASEAN has cleverly strengthened its security relations not 
only with the United States but also with its allies such as Japan and the United 
Kingdom. To begin with, taking note of the “Vientiane Vision” issued by the 
Japanese government in 2016 (Ministry of Defense of Japan n.d.), this association 
has agreed to enhance its defense cooperation with Tokyo (ASEAN and Japan 
2017), and supported several programs proposed by Japan to build the capacity 
of the Southeast Asian nations to deal with regional security challenges (Ministry 
of Defence of Singapore 2018a). On a yearly basis since 2017, for the purpose of 
capacity-building, ASEAN has been carrying out with Tokyo the ASEAN-Japan 
Ship Rider Cooperation Program (see Parameswaran 2019a). 
In addition, some individual ASEAN members have taken measures 
to strengthen their security cooperation with the United Kingdom, thereby 
effectively diversifying their association’s de facto security partners. While 
there have been several notable developments—for example, several defense 
meetings held between Vietnam and the United Kingdom in the last few 
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years (Parameswaran 2019b)—the policy of Singapore is particularly notable. 
The city-state has maintained cooperative security relations with the United 
Kingdom for a long time, but taken a few additional measures to strengthen 
such relations even further in recent years. Most notably, in June 2018, it signed 
a memorandum of understanding with London, so as to broaden the scope of 
security cooperation between the two countries, to include new issues such as 
counter-terrorism, counter-improvised explosive devices, maritime security, and 
disaster relief (see Ministry of Defence of Singapore 2018b). By so doing, it has 
effectively highlighted the relevance of the Five Power Defence Arrangements 
(FPDA) to Southeast Asian regional security. Although the original purpose of 
the FPDA in 1971 was simply to tighten the security of Singapore and Malaysia, 
today this set of defense arrangements complements the existing regional security 
arrangements in Southeast Asia and beyond, including those centered on the 
United States (Emmers 2010). 
Conclusions
In its dealings with the BRI, an association of minor powers in Southeast Asia 
has proactively advanced its own interests. It has done so by skillfully conducting 
equidistant diplomacy with China and the United States, without becoming too 
remote from or too close to either one of them, thereby reaping benefits from 
its favorable relations with each of them. The case of ASEAN testifies that minor 
powers are not always at the mercy of major powers. Today global geopolitical 
competition has become intense, as rising powers such as China, Russia, and 
Iran have been expanding their presence around the world, and challenging the 
existing international order established by the European and North American 
powers in the twentieth century (Mead 2014). Even under such circumstances, 
the Southeast Asian association has been successful in proactively advancing its 
own interests by its own means. Ultimately, it is not always true to say that the 
“more powerful…have more to say about which games will be played and how” 
(Waltz 1979, 194), and the “fortunes of all states…are determined primarily by 
the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability” (Mearsheimer 
2001, 5). 
Both realists and constructivists who have written on ASEAN should 
pay serious attention to the findings of the present study, which highlights the 
diplomatic potential of this association. On the one hand, realists are usually 
pessimistic about ASEAN’s ability, due to the insignificant military and economic 
capabilities of its members (see, for example, Leifer 1996; Jones and Smith 2007). 
On the other hand, constructivists tend to be more optimistic about its ability, yet 
their central concern is the promotion of its identity and norms in Southeast Asia 
and beyond (see, for example, Acharya 1998; 2014; Johnston 1999; 2008, Chap. 
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4). Both of them should become aware of the fact that, in its dealings with the 
BRI, the Southeast Asian association has successfully advanced its own interests, 
without having significant material capabilities which satisfy realists and without 
exercising ideational entrepreneurship which excites constructivists. It can be said 
that the diplomacy of ASEAN not only brings tangible benefits to its members 
but also expands the frontiers of the knowledge of International Relations. 
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Notes
1.  A few authors have argued that ASEAN members have maintained equidistant 
diplomatic relations with external powers. To illustrate, Evan Laksmana (2017) has used 
the notion of “pragmatic equidistance” to understand Indonesia’s relations with both 
Beijing and Washington. Oh Ei Sun and David Han (2016) have argued that Malaysia has 
sought to build equidistant relations with both China and the United States. 
2.  Singapore signed with the United States a memorandum of understanding in 1990 
to allow this global player to use its military facilities, a strategic framework agreement for 
a closer defense partnership in 2005, and an enhanced defense cooperation agreement as 
a new framework for defense cooperation in 2015 (see Ministry of Defence of Singapore 
2005; Singapore and the United States 2015). 
3.  According to the Center for Global Development, among the sixty-eight countries 
which are identified as potential BRI borrowers, eight of them are at high risk of debt 
distress, and Laos is one of them. Fifteen of them are at some risk of debt distress. 
Cambodia is one of them and Sri Lanka is another (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2018).
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